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Testing the 'White Hat Effect
in Patent Litigation
Bernard Chao & Roderick O'Dorisio*

Introduction
Ideally, juries assess cases on the evidence presented at trial. To the extent
that they are unrelated to the merits, the identities of the parties or their individual stories should not matter. But jurors are human, and both academics
and practicing lawyers have long believed that how parties frame their cases
to the jury can influence outcomes.' We examine two such frames common
to patent law. First, we look at whether accused infringers can improve their
chances of prevailing by being the aggressor. Prior studies have observed that
accused infringers that file declaratory judgment actions to vindicate their
rights win more often than those that are sued by patent holders. However,
these results may simply be an artifact of the accused infringers suing on
stronger cases. To date, no studies have tried to control for these selection
effects and determine whether it is truly the story that sways juries. Second,
we look at whether non-practicing entities are less likely to prevail in a patent
suit than a practicing entity that sues its competitor. Both commentators and
the press have disparaged these entities, labelling them "patent trolls." We
examine whether these portrayals affect potential juries as they decide cases.
To test these frames, we created four different video presentations to simulate
the arguments real trial attorneys would make at trial and ran a 2x2 betweensubjects experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk. We successfully recruited
314 participants and found that mock juries render verdicts at higher rates for

* Professor Chao is an Associate Professor at the University of Denver, Director of its
Intellectual Property certificate program and co-Director for the Denver Empirical Justice
Institute. Mr. O'Dorisio is a law student at the University of Denver expecting to graduate with his J.D. in 2018. The authors would like to thank John Campbell, Christopher
Robertson, David Schwartz, and participants of the PatCon 7 Conference at Northwestern
University Law School for their comments on early versions of this paper, Catherine Durso
for help with the statistical analysis and John Allison, Mark Lemley, and David Schwartz
(again) for sharing their underlying data from their earlier study.
' See e.g., Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory ofJurorDecisionMaking:
The Story Model, 13 CADozo L. REv. 519, 542 (1991) (reporting that sequences of available evidence were less compelling to mock jurors than cases presented in narrative form);
Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281, 297-98 (2013) (citing to a
long list of authorities that demonstrate that advocates believe in the power of a good story).
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accused infringers that file declaratory judgment actions than those where the
patentee initiated the lawsuit. Even though the declaratory judgment effects
that we observed were smaller than what others have previously observed in
the field, we believe the differences can be explained by selection effects in
earlier studies. In addition, our study found that mock jurors awarded practicing entities infringement decisions at a higher rate than non-practicing
entities. We discuss the implications for strategy and policy in this Article.

I. Declaratory Judgments in Patent Litigation
When a company is accused of patent infringement, the classic responses
are either to take a license or stay quiet and hope that the patentee will not
file suit.2 However, another option is to take an aggressive stance and sue the
patentee first. The Declaratory Judgment Act authorizes federal courts to
"declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party" so long
as an "actual controversy" exists.3 Declaratory judgments provide relief to a
party "who is reasonably at legal risk because of an unresolved dispute, to
obtain judicial resolution of that dispute without having to await the commencement of legal action by the other side."4' Thus, an accused infringer may
bring a declaratory judgment action against a patent holder, claiming that it
does not infringe a patent or that the patent at issue is invalid or otherwise
unenforceable. In these cases, the patent owner is the defendant and the accused infringer is the plaintiff.5
Filing a declaratory judgment action gives an accused infringer several advantages. First, it allows the accused infringer to choose a forum that favors
defendants in patent cases. 6 Studies have shown that different courts have
markedly different win/loss rates in patent cases.7 For example, patentees have

2

See Colleen V. Chien, HoldingUpandHoldingOut,21 MICH.

TELECOMM. &TECH. L. REv.

1, 20 (2014) (describing how some companies abuse this tactic and "holdout" against meritorious patent claims).

28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2010).
BP Chemicals Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 977 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
PETER S. MENELL ET AL., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE, § 2.2.1.2 (3d
ed. 2016) (explaining how accused infringers may initiate a declaratory judgment action),
https://www.fc.gov/content/321534/patent-case-management-judicial-guide-third-edition
archivedat https://perma.cc/Z9BH-ES6U.
6 Kimberly Moore, Forum Shoppingin Patent Cases:Does GeographicChoiceAffectInnovation?, 79 N.C. L. REv. 889, 920 (2001).
2 John Allison, Mark Lemley, & David Schwartz, Understandingthe Realities of Modern
PatentLitigation,92 TEx. L. REv.1769, 1793 tbl.3A (2014) (showing definitive patentee win
rates ranging from 45% to 5% in the ten major districts); Sam Williams, A Havenfor Patent
4
2
Pirates, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 6, 2006), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/ 05 59/ahaven-for-patent-pirates/ archivedat https://perma.cc/K543-AGUC (quoting LegalMetric
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far more "definitive wins" in the Eastern District of Texas (45%) than they
do in either the Central District of California (5%) or Northern District of
Illinois (5%).8 Moreover, some courts have adopted procedures that favor
patentees. For example, Daniel Kerman and Greg Reilly have described how
the Eastern District of Texas has adopted several rules that favor patentees.'
Filing a declaratory judgment action also allows an accused infringer to
choose when the lawsuit takes place. An earlier resolution of a dispute helps the
accused infringer pursue an economically sound business strategy. That may
include taking a license, designing around the patent, or continuing to make
its products because the product at issue was found to be non-infringing. In
contrast, when the accused infringer is uncertain as to whether it will prevail
in a later patent lawsuit, it is susceptible to "holdup" as its investment in the
accused technology grows."
Finally, an accused infringer who files a declaratory judgment can tell a
different story than it could if the patentee initiated the lawsuit. As the aggressor, the accused infringer can talk about putting an end to patent threats so
that it can return to business. Rather than allowing the patent holder to talk
about the vindication of its patent rights, the accused infringer now appears
as the injured party, since the accused infringer filed the lawsuit."
Without isolating the precise cause, several studies have observed that accused infringers win more often when they file a declaratory judgment action.
In a 2000 study, Professor Kimberly Moore (prior to her appointment to the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) analyzed all patent cases that went
to trial from 1983 through 1999 and found that "[j]uries are significantly
pro-patentee in suits for infringement (68% patentee win rate); but when an
accused infringer initiates a declaratory judgment action, the patentee only
has a 38% win rate." 12 The data reflected 1,411 cases that reached trial, of

reports that since 1994, patent plaintiffs whose cases go to trial in the E.D. of Texas win
88% of the time, compared with 68% nationwide).
' Definitive wins were defined as "decisions that finally ruled for a party on an issue."
Allison et al., supra note 7, at 1776.
9 See Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. Rav. 241,243 (2016).
" See Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, PatentHoldup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEx. L. Rav.
1991, 2008 (2007) (explaining how injunctions allow for patent holdup, particularly when
sunk costs are high).
1 Kimberly A. Moore, Judges,Juries,and PatentCases: An EmpiricalPeek Inside the Black
Box, 99 MICH. L. Rav. 365, 405 (2000) (suggesting that "the jury is less likely to be biased
in favor of the patentee when the infringer brings suit rather than the patentee ... [because]
juries are more likely to find for the patent holder when they perceive her as the injured
party seeking vindication.").
2 Id. at 368, 406, fig.13.
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which 1,209 were resolved by the factfinder.'3 Of the 1,209 cases, 14% (168
cases) were declaratory judgment actions brought by the alleged infringer. 4
This same study was later updated in 2003 with similar results: a 69%
patentee win rate in suits initiated by the patentee, but only a 40% patentee
win rate when the accused infringer filed a declaratory judgment. 5 The updated study in 2003 included 203 cases between 1983 and 2003 that were
declaratory judgment actions.' 6 Moore also attempted to isolate the declaratory judgment effects by controlling for the year of judgment and whether a
judge or jury heard the case.' 7 This analysis still showed that filing a declaratory judgment on the issue of infringement boosted an accused infringer's
chances of prevailing by 100%.18

In 2014, John Allison, Mark Lemley, and David Schwartz conducted a
comprehensive empirical study of the outcomes of modern patent litigation.' 9
As part of the study, they examined whether accused infringers won more
often when they filed declaratory judgment actions.2" They also found that
"accused infringers who sue for declaratory judgment fare substantially better
than other accused infringers in cases that reach a merits decision."2' Overall,
the patentee win rate was 26% for all definitive merits rulings," but when
accused infringers filed declaratory judgment actions, patentee win rates
decreased to only 11%.23
Both Moore and Allison et. al. acknowledged that selection effects may have
driven their results.24 In other words, accused infringers may file declaratory

'3

Id. at 380.

Id. at 404 (noting that the statistics do not include counterclaim declaratory judgment
actions).
Kimberly A. Moore et al., PATENT LITIGATION AND STRATEGY 53 (4th ed.).
Id. (note that a 40% win rate in DJ actions resulted in eighty-one wins and 122 losses
for a patentee in a DJ action between 1983-2003).
'" Moore used a logistic, rather than a linear, regression model, because the dependent variable, patent-holder win rate, is binary or dichotomous (win or loss). See infra note 59 (citing
DAVID W HosMER, JR. & STANLEY LEMESHOW, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION 1 (1989)).
" See id. at 54 (also showing accused infringers' chances of prevailing in a DJ increase by
121% on issue of validity, 217% on issue of enforceability, and 113% on issue of willfulness).
,9 Allison et al., supra note 7, at 1769 (2014).
20 Id.at 1798.
4

21

Id.

12

Id. at 1787 (finding that patentees won only 164 of the 636 definitive merits rulings,

or 26%).
23 Data found -2.08 logit, which converts to approx. 0.111 probability, or in other words,
an 11.1% chance of winning at trial. (p < 0.01 indicates a statistically significant effect).
24 Allison et al., supra note 7, at 1798 ("we encourage the reader not to read too much
into this result. Selection effects may be at work."); Moore, supra note 11, at 407 ("These
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judgements more often when their defenses are stronger. They also suggested
that accused infringers who file declaratory judgment actions "are more sophisticated than those who just wait to be sued. That greater sophistication may
translate into greater win rates."" Finally, Allison et al. suggested that accused
infringers may win more often because, in declaratory judgments, they "go
first in litigation and get the last word as well."26 However, this hypothesis is
based on an inaccurate understanding of how most declaratory judgments
work in practice. Generally, the party with the burden of proof goes first and
last. Thus, the sequence of evidence is the same in cases where the patentee
7
filed suit and where the accused infringer filed a declaratory judgment action.1
However, that rule does not necessarily apply when the accused infringer also
includes other causes of action where it has the burden of proof or when both
parties have burdens of proof.28 Thus, higher declaratory judgment win rates
probably cannot be explained based on ordering effects.

data suggest that forum selection may impact outcome"); Moore, supra note 15, at 53-54
The difference for jury trials may occur because: (1) there is some advantage gained
by the choice of forum; (2) the infringer benefits from determining when the lawsuit
begins; or (3) the jury is less likely to be biased in favor of the patentee when the
infringer brings suit rather than the patentee.
25 Allison et al., supra note 7, at 1798 (admitting that testing for the quality of counsel
on either side is infeasible, but noting that "it is a possible explanation for these results").
26 Id. at 1797.
27 MENELL ET AL., supra note 5, at § 8.1.2.2.2.1 (it makes sense for a patentee to present
its infringement case first even for declaratory judgment actions); see Plumtree Software Inc.
v. Datamize, LLC, No. C 02-5693 VRW, 2003 WL 25841157, at *1, 4 (N.D. Cal. 2003)
(granting patent holder's motion for realignment in patent infringement case so that patent
holder presents first on issue of infringement); see also Guidetech, Inc. v. Brilliant Instruments, Inc., No. C 09-5517 CW, 2014 WL 12643007 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2014)
("Because invalidity is no longer at issue, GuideTech is the sole party bearing the burden of
proof in this case. The motion is GRANTED and the parties are realigned so that GuideTech is the plaintiff and Brilliant is the defendant."); Ericsson, Inc. v. Harris Corp., No.

CIVA3:98CV2903D, 1999 WL 604827, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 1999)
It is elemental that the party who files a lawsuit is designated as the plaintiff. This
designation is based on the party's burden to prove the claims initially asserted in the
lawsuit. A court normally will not realign the parties from their original designations
unless the plaintiff no longer retains the burden to prove at least one of its claims or
if subsequent events in the case significantly shift the ultimate burden of proof from
the plaintiff to the defendant.
28 See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank of City of N.Y, 314 U.S. 63, 69
(1941) (It is the duty of federal courts to "look beyond the pleadings, and arrange the parties according to their sides in the dispute.") (quoting Dawson v. Columbia Trust Co., 197
U.S. 178, 180 (1905)); see also Animal Care Sys., Inc. v. Hydropac/Lab Prods., Inc., No.
13-CV-00143-MSK-BNB, 2014 WL 103812, at *2 (D. Colo. Jan. 10, 2014) ("Arguably,
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Our goal is to test one of the possible reasons why accused infringers win
more often when they file declaratory judgment actions. Specifically, we seek to
determine if win rates increase because of the narrative that accused infringers
can use when they file declaratory judgment actions. To eliminate selection
effects, we conducted an experiment. This setting allowed us to randomly
assign mock jurors to different experimental conditions while controlling
other factors, including the strength of the case, the attorneys presenting
the case, and even the judge. Besides varying whether the accused infringer
brought a declaratory judgment, we also sought to test one other framing issue-whether the party was a non-practicing entity or not. We describe that
part of our experiment below.

II. Non-Practicing Entities
A non-practicing entity ("NPE") is a person or company that makes money
by enforcing patent rights rather than by using the patented technology to
compete in the marketplace.29 Critics often derogatorily refer to NPEs as
"patent trolls" and argue that they corrupt the U.S. patent system and place
a drag on innovation. ° Practitioners and observers have raised numerous
concerns about problems NPEs cause, including a general increase in patent
litigation suits,3' the risk of hold-up and excessive damages faced by practicing
technology companies,3 2 and concerns that suits are based on poor quality

alignment of parties should follow the burden of proof with the party bearing the burden
being [plaintiff.] But these actions include claims as to which both parties have burdens of
proof....").
29 EXEcUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,

PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION

9-10 (2013) (discussing various studies detailing the costs of patent assertions by NPEs);
Ted Sichelman, CommercializingPatents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341,368 (2010) (non-practicing
entities stifle commercialization of patented inventions by "exploit[ing] litigation and licensing market defects to extract unwarranted rents.").
30

See FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE

IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE
53, 60, 191 (Mar. 2011) available at https://www.ftc.

EVOLVING

AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION,

gov/sites/default/ fles/documents/ reports/evolving-ip-marketplace-al igning-patent-noticeand-remedies-competition-report-federal-trade/ 110307patentreport.pdfarchivedathttps://
perma.cc/CQ7C-KT8X.
" Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths,and Kings: Narrativesand Evidence in the
Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REv. 1571, 1577-82 (2009) (detailing both the
number of NPE suits and explaining how a disproportionate number of these suits involve
multiple defendants).
32 See e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking,
85
single
patent
leverage
a
can
TEx. L. REv. 1991, 2008-10 (2007) (explaining how patentees
to extract settlements that are higher than the contribution the patented technology makes
to the product).
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patents. 3 A 2014 study estimated the "direct costs" of patent troll litigation
in the United States in 2011 at $29 billion!"
The media have also been quite critical ofNPEs. For example, on his popular
television show, Last Week Tonight, John Oliver mocked "patent trolls" that
do not invent or make anything and called the situation "insane."" Other
news outlets, including The Economist, The Wall Street Journal, and NPR
have repeatedly denigrated "patent trolls" and suggested that they harm the
economy." Given the common narrative on NPEs, it seems likely that the
public would view these companies unfavorably.
In response to this concern, most courts already prohibit accused infringers from referring to patentees as "patent trolls," "patent pirates," or similarly
disparaging names. 7 Still, courts generally allow accused infringers to refer
to an NPE as a "non-practicing entity, "patent assertion entity,"" "a company that does not make anything, "a company that does not sell anything,"
or "licensing entity."" However, in some rare cases, courts have been more
stringent in what they allow accused infringers to say about a patent owner
who is an NPE, barring the accused infringer from even referring to the NPE
patent owner as a "non-practicing entity" altogether."

33 John

R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Patent Quality and Settlement

Among Repeat PatentLitigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 707-08 (2011).
" James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REv. 387, 389 (2014) (calculating that NPEs cost society approximately $30 billion
per year and have cost a total of $500 billion over the past twenty years).
31 See Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO television broadcast Apr.
19, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watchv=3bxcc3SMKAarchivedathttps://perma.cc/TF9K-75
59.
36 See The Economist, Patent Trolls: Why No One Likes Them (Mar
3, 2015), http://www.
economist.com/news/business-and-finance/21645604 archivedathttps://perma.cc/3BW3L5HX; John Chambers & Myron E. Ullman, Opinion, Stopping the Economy-SappingPatent
Trolls, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2015, at A9; This American Life: When PatentsAttack!, NPR
(July 22, 2011), available at http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/441/
when-patents-attack archivedat https://perma.cc/8VSC-TKK7.
" See, e.g., Dig. Reg. of Tex., LLC v. Adobe Sys., Inc., No. C 12-1971 CW, 2014 WL
4090550, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2014) (prohibiting Adobe from using a wide array of
"pejorative terms, such as 'patent troll,' 'pirate,' 'bounty hunter,' 'paper patent,' 'playing
the
lawsuit lottery,' and 'shell corporation,' which have negative connotations."); HTC Corp.
v. Tech. Properties Ltd., No. 5:08-cv-00882, 2013 WL 4782598, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6,
2013) (prohibiting HTC "from using derogatory characterizations of patent owners including the use of the term patent troll without prior court approval.").
38 See HTC Corp., 2013 WL 4782598, at *4.
9 See Dig. Reg, 2014 WL 4090550, at *12.
40 See ContentGuard Holdings, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-0 1 12-JRG,
2015 WL 11089489, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2015) (however, Amazon was not precluded
"from a factual discussion of Plaintiff's business model).
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We seek to determine whether these rules are needed. Do juries hold some
form of conscious or unconscious bias against NPEs and render verdicts
against them at a higher rate than they would practicing entities? While there
is clearly an NPE problem, NPEs should not lose cases simply because of who
they are. As Mark Lemley and Douglas Melamed put it, patent trolls "are
not the problem. Rather, they are a symptom of systemic issues the patent
system faces in the [information technology] industry ....4 And the correct
response is to adjust various patent policy levers. A system that discriminates
against NPEs does not solve the underlying problems and will likely lead to
will try to brand the patentee as a
gamesmanship, where accused infringers
"troll" whether or not that label fits. 42

III. The Experiment
A. Hypothesis
The study tests two hypotheses related to the declaratory judgment and
non-practicing entity effects discussed above:
(1) Declaratory Judgment ("DJ") Effect: Juries are more likely to find in favor of the
accused infringer when the accused infringer files a declaratory judgment action against
a patentee, as opposed to when the patentee initiates the lawsuit.
(2) Non-Practicing Entity ("NPE") Effect: Juries are more likely to find in favor of the
accused infringer when the patentee is a non-practicing entity, as opposed to when
the patentee is a practicing entity.

The purpose of this study is to assess whether DJ effects exist and, to the
extent they do, provide some sense of how large these effects are.

B. Experimental Design
We performed an online 2x2 between-subjects experiment using Amazon
Mechanical Turk.43 Amazon Mechanical Turk is an online crowd-sourcing
marketplace." All subjects watched one of four videos that lasted approximately

" Mark Lemley & Douglas Melamed, Missingthe Forestforthe Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REv.
2117, 2180 (2013).
42

See Michael Risch, Framing the patent troll debate, 24 EXPERT OPINION ON THERA-

PEUTIC PATENTS 127 (2013) (discussing the "definitional morass" associated with the term

patent troll and arguing that "[a] lack of rigor will hamper changes in the system if they are
targeted at who owns the patent rather than the behavior of the patent holder").
" Participants were randomly assigned to watch one of our four scenarios and were not
told that there were other variations.
4 mTurk has become a large and robust platform for social science research, with proven
reliability through the replication of many known results. See Gabriele Paolacci, Jesse Chandler, & Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis, Running Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 411, 415-17 (2010) (replicating three classical experiments
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13 minutes. The videos combined four narrated PowerPoint presentations
together. In the first presentation, a presiding judge explained what a patent
was and how to determine whether there is patent infringement. In the second presentation, the patentee's attorney explained the patented technology
and summarized the patentee's infringement case. In the third presentation,
the accused infringer's attorney argued that there was no infringement. Each
attorney's arguments referenced testimony by his expert witness. Finally, in
the last presentation, the presiding judge delivered short jury instructions,
reminding the subjects what the elements of patent infringement are and
the applicable standard of proof. The Authors co-developed the videos by
consulting experienced patent litigators to ensure that the scripts' arguments
were realistic. The arguments on infringement and non-infringement were
identical.
The scenario in the video concerned a patentee accusing an alleged infringer
of infringing on its '123 patent, an Elongated Printhead Orifice. The technology from the fictitious '123 patent was modeled off of an expired patent,
but the Authors modified the claim language. The '123 patent had one claim
with four limitations. This is the claim that was at issue:
A printhead for an inkjet printer including orifices from which ink is ejected, comprising:
an ink ejector;
an ink ejection chamber surrounding the ink ejector;
an orifice plate having an opening with an oval shape; and
an ink feed channel coupled to said ink ejection chamber.

The point of contention between the patentee and the accused infringer
focused on the definition of "oval" as it applies to printheads in the third
limitation of the above claim. Below are the images that were displayed during the trial videos to the subjects, depicting the patentee's print head from
the '123 patent and the accused infringer's printhead:

on mTurk and finding that mTurk workers "exhibit the class heuristics and biases and pay
attention to directions at least as much as subjects from traditional sources"); see also Adam
J. Berinsky, Gregory A. Huber, & Gabriel S. Lenz, EvaluatingOnline LaborMarketsfor ExperimentalResearch:Amazon.com' Mechanical Turk, 20 POL. ANALYSIS 351, 362-63 (2012)
(successfully replicating three experiments using mTurk).
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Figure 1.
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The patentee's attorney relied on the testimony of its expert witness, a
professor of Mechanical Engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology to prove that the stadium-shaped print head infringed the '123
patent. The expert's testimony said that an oval does not have a precise mathematical definition. It can be any kind of elongated circle where one axis is
longer than the other. Thus, according to the patentee's expert, the '123 patent
covered the accused infringer's stadium-shaped printhead. Conversely, the
accused infringer's attorney relied on testimony from its expert, a California
Institute of Technology mathematics professor. This expert said that an oval
is a closed plane curve with one or two axes of symmetry. Because the shape
of the accused infringer's printhead is a "stadium" shape and not curved all
the way around, it is not an oval shape. We crafted this argument in hopes of
creating a close case on infringement. These arguments remained unchanged
across all four trial videos.
However, we manipulated the procedural context and party identity in the
four different scenarios. The first scenario was a regular infringement lawsuit
brought by a practicing entity against an accused infringer. The second scenario
was a declaratory judgment action brought by an accused infringer against
a practicing entity. The third scenario was a regular infringement lawsuit
brought by a non-practicing entity against an accused infringer. The fourth
scenario was a declaratory judgment action brought by an accused infringer
against a non-practicing entity.45
In the first and second scenarios, which involved a practicing entity, the
attorney for the patentee stated that the patentee is one of the largest and

5 see

infra Appendix C for visual explanation of four different trial scenarios, including

portions of the script and PowerPoint slides actually used in the study.

TESTING THE WHITE HAT EFFECT IN PATENT LITIGATION

most trusted manufacturers and suppliers of printers.46 The patentee's attorney
explained that the patentee sent numerous letters to the accused infringer
demanding that the accused infringer either pay the patentee a royalty or stop
infringing the patent. In response, the attorney for the accused infringer argued
that the patentee, a practicing entity, only began sending demand letters to
the accused infringer when the patentee realized that it was losing market
share. However, when the accused infringer filed the declaratory judgment
action (second scenario), the patentee's attorney pointed out that the accused
infringer had "the gall to sue us," and the accused infringer's attorney stated
that the accused infringer just wanted to "get back to real business, making
world class printers" and beating the patentee in the marketplace. 7
In the third and fourth scenarios involving a non-practicing entity, the attorney for the patentee stated that the patentee is a leading printer technology
company that buys patents and licenses them to those companies that need
the technology. As in the first two scenarios, patentee's attorney stated that
the patentee had sent numerous letters to the accused infringer demanding
that the accused infringer either pay the patentee a royalty or stop infringing the patent. However, in the third and fourth scenarios, the attorney for
the accused infringer tried to use the patentee's status as an NPE against the
patentee. The accused infringer's attorney pointed out that the patentee does
not make anything, but merely owns patents and tries to make money from
real technology companies that actually make products. Notably, the accused
infringer did not call the patentee a patent troll, or even a non-practicing
entity or patent assertion entity. This reflects one of the different limitations
that courts impose on accused infringers. 8
Under each of the four experimental conditions, subjects rendered individual
judgments, responding "yes" or "no"to the prompt: "Did the [patentee] prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that [accused infringer] infringed Claim
#1 of the '123 patent?" We then asked the jurors to "please rate how strong
your belief in your previous answer is" by selecting whether they "strongly,"
"moderately," or "slightly" believe that the accused infringer infringed the '123
patent. Next, we asked the jurors to "Please provide 2-3 sentences explaining
your reasoning for your answers on infringement." Finally, we checked the

46 See

infra Appendix C ("Precision Graphics is one of the largest and most trusted
manufacturers and suppliers of printers. The defendant, Alpine Printers, also makes printers,
infingingprinters,that directly compete with Precision Graphics.").
47 See infra Appendix
C
When my client learned that Alpine Printers had wrongly taken their technology and
was infringing the '123 patent, it sent numerous letters demanding that Alpine either
pay Precision Graphics a royalty or stop infringing the patent. They did neither. Instead,
Alpine continued to infringe the patent and then had the gall to sue us.
41 See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying
text.
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jurors' understanding of the procedural posture in the case by asking them
whether the patentee made and sold its own printers and asking them if the
patentee or the accused infringer filed the current lawsuit.
C. Respondents
We recruited subjects from the population of workers on Amazon Mechanical Turk ("MTurk") in April 2017 and screened for those that were
"jury eligible," meaning residents of the United States over age eighteen who
could read, write, and speak English. Subjects were paid $2.50 to complete
the experiment online. All subjects consented in accordance with the Institutional Review Board requirements. We also administered a demographic
questionnaire at the beginning of the survey.
In total, 314 people completed the online experiment." The sample was
more male, educated, and younger than the population at large; race and
median income, on the other hand, were more closely representative of U.S.
Census data.5" Balance checks did not reveal any differences in demographic
compositions across the four experimental groups.

IV. Results
A. The Data
Five hundred participants provided responses, but we used timing checks
to disqualify several of those participants. Participants who spent less than
13 minutes watching our video presumably skipped ahead. Participants who
spent more than 21 minutes watching the video presumably walked away
while watching and returned later.5 Thus, we only included the 314 respondents who completed the survey between 13 and 21 minutes. The results of
our experiment are presented below in Table 1.

" Six-hundred twenty-one people started the survey. The 20% attrition rate reflects subjects

who dropped out of the survey voluntarily or were ejected from the survey for skipping past
a video before enough time elapsed to possibly watch its entirety (thereby indicating task
non-compliance). At least in terms demographics, the subset of persons dropping from the
survey as statistically indistinguishable from the final study population.

5oSpecifically, the sample demographics were as follows: 55.21% male; mean age of 36,
respectively; 82.65% white, 6%African American, 6.3% Asian, 1%American Indian, and

the rest other; and 48.5% with a bachelor's degree or higher.
We selected these limits before analyzing the results.
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Table 1. Patentee % Win Rate (Patentee Wins/Total)
Regular
Infringement
(Patentee

Declaratory
Judgment
(Accused Infringer

Combined
(Regular
Lawsuit and

Brings Lawsuit)

Brings Lawsuit)

DJ)

Patentee is Practicing Entity

39.3% (35/89)

32.5% (26/80)

36.1% (61/169)

Patentee is Non-Practicing

27.5% (22/80)

16.9% (11/65)

23.0% (33/145)

33.7% (57/169)

25.5% (37/145)

29.9% (94/314)

Entity
Combined (Practicing and NPE)

Looking at the descriptive statistics, mock jurors awarded patentees a win
(an infringement verdict) 29.9% of the time. The patentee's win rate was
33.7% when it sued the accused infringer, but dropped to (25.5%) when
the accused infringer filed a declaratory judgment action. There was an even
more noticeable effect when we manipulated the patentee's identity. When
the patentee was a practicing entity that competed with the accused infringer,
the patentee won 36.1% of the time. However, when the patentee was a nonpracticing entity its win rate dropped (23.0%). In short, the patentee won
less often when the accused infringer filed a declaratory judgment action or
when the patentee was a non-practicing entity.
The descriptive statistics provide a general sense of our results, but don't
show how reliable our results are. Confidence intervals can shed light on this
question. We calculated 95% confidence intervals for both our manipulations. The confidence interval for the declaratory judgment action estimated
that when the accused infringer filed a declaratory judgment, the patentee's
chances of winning changed by +2.0% to -18.0% with a central estimate of
-9.2% (the most likely estimate).52 The 95% confidence interval for the NPE
effect estimated that a patentee's chances of winning were reduced by 3.2%
to 23.0% when the patentee was a non-practicing entity. T1he central estimate
was a 13.3% reduction.

52

Because this estimate crosses 0, it suggests that our results did not quite reach what is

generally considered statistical significance (p <.05). However, our more sensitive regression

analysis did find statistically significant results.
We previously ran a pilot with a small sample (n = 100). Because participants failed to
answer comprehension checks on the DJ question, we changed the stimulus to both clarify
and emphasize why the accused infringer was filing a declaratory judgment. With respect to
1

the issue of NPEs the facts were substantially the same. However, we did not observe a NPE
effect in the pilot. When we add the results from the pilot to our main study, we still find
a NPE effect albeit a smaller one. The 95% confidence interval estimated that a patentee's
chances of winning were reduced by 0.00% to 17.2% when it was a non-practicing entity.
The central estimate was an 8.61% reduction in patentee wins.
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We also conducted a logistic regression analysis to more precisely model
both DJ and NPE effects. 4 Our initial model only considered DJ and NPE
effects. We did not include an interaction variable (that might show changes
that resulted from a combination of both the DJ and NPE effects) nor did we
control for any demographics. Because we were only interested in whether our
results showed that a particular manipulation decreased win rates, we could
use p < 0.1 to determine statistical significance, which is a standard benchmark
for statistically significant results in single-tailed hypotheses (as opposed to a
two-tailed hypothesis). As shown in Table 2 below, our DJ effect just crossed
the threshold for statistical significance (p = 0.0966), while our NPE effect
shows strong statistical significance (p < 0.01). Using the coefficients from
column two, we then calculated the log-odds value of both the DJ effect and
the NPE effect (column 3).
Table 2. Logistic Regression Output (No Interaction)
Coefficient

Log Odds
Ratio

Std. Error

z-value

P-value
(Wald)

Intercept

-0.3781

0.6852

0.1964

-1.925

0.05421

DJ effect
NPE effect

-0.4213

0.6562

0.2536

-0.6671

0.5132

0.2562

-1.661
-2.604

0.09664*
0.00921**

These values help us understand the extent of both the DJ effect and the
NPE effect and provide us with a way to compare our experimental results
with the data observed by both the Moore and Allison et al. studies. In Table
3, we show how to interpret the log odds ratio. 'The second column represents
the base probability of the patentee prevailing when there is: (1) a regular
infringement action (no DJ); and (2) the patentee is a practicing entity.
Table 3. Patentee Win Rate Probabilities
Base Probabilities
(No DJ, No NPE)

DJ Effect
Probabilities

NPE Effect
Probabilities

DJ Effect +
NPE Effect

-1.0

0.269

0.195

0.159

0.110

-0.435

0.393

0.298

0.249

0.0

0.500

0.396

0.339

0.179
0.252

1.0

0.731

0.641

0.582

0.478

Logit
Coefficient

As illustrated in Table 3, the patentee win rate probability continues to
decrease from left to right across the four columns. For example, consider

" We also analyzed how the DJ effect may interact with the NPE effect. But the results of
that logistic regression were not statistically significant. Therefore, we do not report them here.
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the base probability of 0.393 that we observed in our experiment. This is
the probability of a patentee winning 39.3% of the time and losing 60.7%
of the time in a regular infringement lawsuit (the patentee sues first) where
the patentee is a practicing entity (as in, not a troll). Since we observed average patentee win rate, the log-odds ratios for the DJ effect and NPE effect
are most valid around this baseline. By only switching the regular infringement action to a DJ action (accused infringer sues first), the probability of
a patentee winning drops from 39.3% to 29.8%. Even more significantly,
by only switching the patentee from a practicing entity to a non-practicing
entity (or troll), the probability of a patentee winning drops to 24.9%. Finally, the most significant effect from our experimental data can be seen in
the final column. By combining both the DJ effect and the NPE effect, the
probability of a patentee winning drops from 39.3% to 17.9%. Thus, the
chances of a patentee winning are cut by more than half simply by changing two narratives. Importantly, both the DJ effect and NPE effects are not
linear. Both effects are more pronounced as the patentee's baseline chances
of winning increases. For example, when the patentee's baseline chance of
winning is 26.9%, switching the patentee to an NPE reduces the win rate by
9.0%. However, when patentee's baseline chance of winning is 73.1%, the
same change reduced the win rate by 14.9%.
Importantly, our experiment is only measuring one potential reason accused infringers win more when they file declaratory judgment actions.
Since the narrative was the only difference between conditions, we can be
confident that it caused any significantly different outcomes. The experiment
either implicitly or explicitly controlled for all other factors. For example,
the quality of the attorneys and strength of case were identical because the
mock jurors assigned to different experimental conditions saw and heard the
exact same visuals and arguments. Moreover, even though the experiment did
not mention a particular forum, mock jurors from all over the country were
randomly assigned to the different conditions. In contrast, the Allison et. al.
study looked at actual data of every patent case filed in 2008 and 2009. The
outcomes they observed necessarily included all potential causal factors. By
subtracting our results from the Allison et al. results, we can gain some sense
of the relative importance the narrative has on the higher win rates Allison
et. al. observed.
Allison et. al. also calculated logit values for several variables, including
the patentee's win rate at trial as a function of the accused infringer initiating
suit with a declaratory judgment action (-2.08)."5 The overall probability of a
patentee winning in a declaratoryjudgment action is significantly smaller than

" Allison et al., supra note 7, did not publish these values in their article, but they kindly
shared their data with us and we have a copy in our files.

17o

FEDERAL CIRCUIT BAR JouRNAL VOL. 27,

No.

2

the percentages we derived from our experimental data. To better illustrate
the differences in our results, see the graph below:
Graph 1. Patentee Win Rate Probabilities
-
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The solid line at the top represents the base probability that the patentee
will win any given case. That rate can vary from 0 to 100%. The dotted line
represents the DJ effect we detected in our experiment. For any given win rate,
it shows the lower win rate we would expect based on our model. Notably,
both Allison et. al. and Moore observed an even larger DJ effect. We do not
have the underlying data from the Moore study, but we do have the data for
the Allison study and those results are shown by the bottom dashed line.
We use the three diamond symbols to illustrate how to interpret Graph
1. The top diamond represents a case where the patentee has a 50% base
probability of winning. The second middle diamond shows the effects predicted by our model. The same patentee's chances of prevailing in a DJ action decreases to 39.6%. It appears that the ability of the accused infringer
to advance more persuasive arguments drives down patentee win rates. But
that is not the full story. The third lower diamond represents the larger effects
observed by Allison et. al.'s study. The probability of a patentee prevailing in
a DJ action decreases to a meager 11.1%. The gap between the DJ effects we
observed (dotted line) and Allison et. al.'s results (dashed line) suggest that
other causes drive patents win rates even lower. These may be the strength of
case or quality of the attorney. However, this does not include forum effects
because Allison et al. controlled for forum in their calculations.
For a more holistic comparison, Graph 2 shows the DJ effect, the NPE
effect, and the combination of both effects of our study.
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Graph 2. Patentee Win Rate Probabilities
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The solid line is our baseline and represents the different possible chances
that a patentee will win any given lawsuit. It assumes that the patentee initiated the lawsuit and that the patentee is a practicing entity. The dotted line
below the solid line represents our DJ effect. It shows how much patentee
win rates decrease when the accused infringer files for declaratory judgment.
The line with shorter dashes represents the NPE effect. It shows how much
the patentee's win rate decreases from the baseline when the patentee is a
NPE. As the relative positon of the dotted line and shorter dashed line show,
the NPE effect is larger than the DJ effect we observed. Finally, the bottom
line with dashes and dots represents the combined effect of both the DJ and
NPE effects. As mentioned above, the red diamond marker represents the
patentee win rate in a DJ case when the base probability is 50%. In other
words, when the base probability of the patentee prevailing in a case is 50%,
the probability of that same patentee prevailing in a DJ action decreases to
39.6%. The probability of that same patentee prevailing when the patentee is
a NPE decreases to 33.9%. The probability of that same patentee prevailing
in a DJ action and when the patentee is a NPE decreases to 25.2%.
B. Implications

Our study found that patentees are less likely to prevail when an accused
infringer first files a declaratory judgment action, as opposed to when the
patentee initiates the lawsuit. Not surprisingly, our results showed smaller
effects than prior observational studies. That is because our experiment only
manipulated the narrative, while prior studies observed actual outcomes that
were likely driven by other factors, as well. Notably, if we consider our results
in combination with Allison et al.'s data, it appears that these other factors
provide greater explanatory power for the decreased patentee win rates. However, since real-world narratives may be more or less persuasive than the one
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we tested, we do not believe readers should rely upon the particular numerical
values we found. Rather, our findings suggest a more general concept: accused infringers filing declaratory judgment actions can modestly reduce the
patentee's chances of winning. That finding could interest litigants, because
even a modest change in the likelihood of winning is meaningful in a high
stakes patent case.
Regarding our NPE effect results, we confirmed the conventional wisdom.
Our results indicate that the accused infringer can increase its chance of winning by simply referring to the patentee's business model in negative terms.
This was true even though the accused infringer in our trial did not use the
term "patent troll," "non-practicing entity," or "patent assertion entity." Furthermore, the NPE effect was more significant than the DJ effect. In other
words, holding all other variables constant, an accused infringer is more likely
to win against an NPE-patentee in any case (DJ or regular infringement) than
against any patentee (NPE or not) in only DJ cases.
These findings suggest that courts should carefully consider what they allow
accused infringers to say about NPEs. It may not be sufficient to just prohibit
an accused infringer from referring to the patentee as a "patent troll." Courts
may want to also prevent the accused infringer from referring to the patentee's
business model all together. Allowing accused infringers to use these kinds of
statements caused NPEs to lose more often in our experiment.
C. Limitations
Our study had several limitations. First, in our experiment, the patentee's
win rates hovered around 30-35%, a moderately pro-defense case. Other
patent cases may be stronger or weaker on the merits. These differences could
impact the results, because the case framing may be more influential in close
cases and less influential in cases that strongly favor one side over another.
Second, in our experiment, the attorneys made their arguments through
narrated PowerPoint presentations. The respondents were not able to see the
attorneys; they only heard them. The respondents also did not see or hear the
expert witnesses. Rather, the attorneys discussed the expert testimonies. Live
testimony and arguments may be more powerful than attorneys narrating
PowerPoint presentations. While it is possible that any such effects were offsetting because both the patentee and accused infringer presented arguments
in this fashion, it is also possible that the manner of presentation muted the
importance of the arguments, thereby increasing the influence that different
frames had on the respondents.
Third, our experiment used one set of arguments to implement each manipulation. While we attempted to simulate arguments that parties make in
actual patent cases, attorneys at trial may frame their narratives differently.
Also, some courts may give attorneys more or less leeway in what they are
permitted to say. For example, some courts allow an accused infringer to
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openly discuss an NPE's business model, while other courts ban all reference
to that topic. 56 1he size of the effects we saw is likely to change as attorneys
make more or less persuasive arguments.
Fourth, we used a 13-minute abridged civil trial for our experimental scenarios. The condensed scenarios allowed us to utilize a randomized controlled
trial experimental design, which is the gold standard for scientific research.
However, there are still reasonable concerns about external validity. One might
expect that patentee win rates may be increased or decreased if outweighed by
more trial evidence. However, we structured the abridged case to give both
sides a comparably equal amount of evidence through two different expert
witnesses. Thus, a longer trial with more evidence may not have affected the
results in any significant way.
Fifth, we did not study real juries. Prior research has shown that "the population of Mechanical Turk is at least as representative of the U.S. population as
traditional subject pools."57 Known experimental results have been replicated
using the MTurk population.58 Nonetheless, MTurk participants may be
more easily distracted from the trial as compared to real jurors and may even
provide false responses (for example, jurors who failed to watch the entire
video without hearing all the arguments and rendered a verdict). Real jurors
may be more earnest in their efforts to provide meaningful responses or to
determine infringement differently, knowing that the outcomes will impact
real individuals and companies. Moreover, our results are based on individual
responses and did not account for deliberation. While actual deliberation
may have changed our results, studies have suggested that individual juror
decisions are the best predictor of jury outcome.' 9
Finally, our simulated patent experiment necessarily omitted significant
parts of real patent trials. We did not instruct respondents on claim construction, nor did we present arguments on validity or damages. In patent trials,
judges typically instruct juries on the meaning of different claim terms. 6 We
omitted that part of the trial because we believe that the task we asked of our
respondents was essentially the same as the infringement determination that
real juries make. Similarly, we do not have any reason to believe that omitting validity and damages issues should systematically affect infringement
outcomes, but we certainly cannot exclude that possibility.

56

See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.

57 Paolacci

et al., supra note 44, at 411.
Id. at 411, 415-17; Berinsky et al., supra note 44, at 361-65 (2012).
'9 Brian H. Bornstein & Edie Greene, Jury Decision Making: Implicationsfor andfrom
Psychology, 20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. Sci. 63, 65 (2011).
See generally, MENELL ET AL., supra note 5.

174

FEDERAL CIRCUIT BAR JOURNAL VOL. 27,

No.

2

Conclusion
Based on our experiment, we reach two sets of conclusions. First, we show
that accused infringers are more likely to prevail when they initiate a lawsuit by
filing a declaratory judgment action. Unlike prior studies, our results suggest
that this outcome is not just driven by selection effects. Accused infringers
that file declaratory judgments can tell a story about filing suit so that they
can return to business. This may counsel some accused infringers to more
seriously consider filing declaratory judgments. At the same, patent holders
may wish to reduce the likelihood of a declaratory judgment action by being more cautious when they make infringement accusations that provide
declaratory judgment jurisdiction.
Second, we confirm that jury pools have a bias against non-practicing
entities, and the effect is even more pronounced when the accused infringer
brings a DJ action. Respondents were significantly more likely to rule in
favor of the accused infringer when the patentee was an NPE. While this
information may inform litigation tactics in NPE lawsuits, our intent is to
inform the courts. Our study should provide evidence for NPEs as they file
motions in limine to prevent accused infringers from prejudicially describing
the NPEs business model.
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Appendix A - Regression Models
The estimated coefficients must be interpreted with care. Instead of the
slope coefficients being the rate of change in Y (the dependent variables) as X
changes (as in other regression models), now the slope coefficient isinterpreted
as the rate of change in the "log odds" as X changes." This explanation is not
very irtuitive, and that is why we have included it here.
However, the interpretation of the logit coefficient, which is usually more
intuitive, is known as the "odds ratio." The odds ratio is the probability of
the event divided by the probability of the nonevent. For example, if A = 2,
then a one unit change in X would make the event twice as likely (0.67/0.33)
to occur. Odds ratios equal to 1 mean that there is a 50/50 chance that the
event will occur with a small change in the independent variable. Negative
coefficients lead to odds ratios less than one, indicating that a certain outcome
is less likely to occur. Because both the DJ effect and the NPE effect caused
patentee win rates to be less likely, our table below illustrates negative log
odds ratios.
The first table below illustrates the odds ratio and p-value for both the
DJ effect and the NPE effect without considering the cross-over effects. In
other words, the first table treats both practicing entities and NPEs the same
regarding the DJ effect and treats both regular infringement and DJ actions
the same regarding the NPE effect.
Odds Ratio and P-Value (No Interaction)
DJ Effect
NPE Effect

Odds Ratio

P-Value

-0.4213

P < 0.09664
P < 0.00921

-0.6671

The second table below illustrates the odds ratio and p-value for both
the DJ effect and the NPE effect. It also seeks to determine whether there
is any interaction between the two effects (i.e., how the DJ effect may affect
the NPE effect and vice versa). Our results from this regression yielded no
statistically significant results.
Odds Ratio and P-Value (Interaction)
Odds Ratio

P-Value

DJ Effect

-0.2973

p < 0.3568

NPE Effect
DJ with Troll

-0.5358
-0.3244

p < 0.1059
p < 0.5370

Our study only addresses the results shifting in a single direction of interest. We only tested for the possibility of the relationship in one direction and

176

FEDERAL CIRCUIT BAR JOURNAL VOL. 27, No. 2

completely disregarded the possibility of a relationship in the other direction.
In other words, we do not care if both (1) jury perception of who is the injured
party; and (2) whether the patentee is a practicing entity or non-practicing
entity were significantly more effective than previously assumed. We only
wish to show that these effects are not less significant.
As a result of using a one-tailed test, our p-value is now set at p < 0.1 to
show significance. The p-value approach involves determining "likely" or
"unlikely" by determining the probability-assuming the null hypothesis
were true--of observing a more extreme test statistic in the direction of the
alternative hypothesis than the one observed. Both p-values in the first table
above are below the aa value, which is set at 0.10. Because they are below
the oa value, they are both statistically significant.
However, in the second table, all p-values are above the 0.1 threshold;
therefore, none of the effects is statistically significant, because the confidence
intervals of each of those effects contains the null hypothesis.
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Appendix B - Regression Models
Logit Coefficient Table
Variable
DJ
NPE

Basic Model (DJ+NPE)

All Model

-0.4213
-0.6671**

-0.5166*
-0.6959**

Gender (female)

0.2739

Age

0.0103

Ethnicity

0.0061

Education

-1.108
0.3003

Income
Intercept

-0.3781

1.3881

Basic Model (DJ+NPE)

All Model

p < 0.05

*

p < 0.01
p < 0.001

Probability (%) Table
Variable
DJ
NPE

39.6

37.36*

33.9**

33.27**

Gender (female)

56.81

Age

50.26

Ethnicity

50.15

Education

24.82
57.45

Income
Intercept
p < 0.05
** p < 0.01

*** p < 0.001

40.66

80.03
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Appendix C - Experimental Manipulations Only

'

A. Scenario #1 (Regular Infringement): Practicing Entity v. Alleged
Infringer

Precsio Gra

"This lawsuit was brought by the
plaintiffPrecision Graphics against
the defendant Alpine Printers.
Precision Graphics is the owner of
the '123 patent and a large manufacturer of printers. The attorney
for the plaintiff, Precision Graph-

, I.

V.A

ics, will argue that the defendant,
Alpine Printers, infringes the '123 patent. The attorney for the defendant,
Alpine Printers, will argue that Alpine Printers does NOT infringe the '123
patent.
"Precision Graphics is one of the
largest and most trusted manufac....
turers and suppliers ofprinters. The
defendant, Alpine Printers, also
makes printers, infringingprinters,
that directly compete with Preci_sion
Graphics."
"When my client learned that
Alpine Printers had wrongly taken their technology and was infringing the
'123 patent, we sent numerous letters demanding that Alpine either pay
Precision Graphics a royalty or stop infringing the patent. They did neither.
That's why we are here today, and that's why we filed this lawsuit. After you
have seen the evidence, I am confident that you will conclude that Alpine
Printers has been infringing the '123 patent."
*

*

*

-

0

0

-

"

"That's why you should give us a
verdict of infringement and make
our competitor, Alpine Printers,
pay for the damage they've done to
our sales and marketability of our
patented oval-shaped printhead."

CD
61

For brevity, those portions of the script that remain the same from scenario to scenario

have been omitted.
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"Ladies and Gentlemen of thejury,

A

-

-

.

I represent the defendant, Alpine
(
I
Printers, in this case. When Precision Graphics realized that they
were losing to Alpine Printers in
market place, they chose to file a
lawsuit against Alpine.
"However, Alpine Printers
knows that it does NOT infringe the '123 patent. We just want to get back
to business, making world class printers and beating Precision Graphics in
the marketplace. And after you see the evidence, I am sure you will agree with
us and return a verdict of no infringement."
"The patent holder, Precision
a tn
Graphics, keeps on telling you that
Cl a m h
I
Alpine Printers somehow "took"
their technology. Nothing could
.o
r;
Oval
i
be further from the truth. Alpine
and
developed its stadium-shaped
....
..
in
indepentechnology
printhead
dently from Precision Graphics.
We didn't even know that Precision Graphics had a patent on oval-shaped
printhead technology until after we had been selling our printers. We had been
beating them in the market and then suddenly they sent us a letter accusing
us of patent infringement. That is the first time we learned of their patent."
-

"That's why you need to return a
non-infringement verdict. Reject
Precision Graphics lawsuit and

let us compete with them in the
marketplace."

__
-

i8o
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B. Scenario #2 (Declaratory Judgment): Alleged Infringer v. Practicing
Entity
"The plaintiff Alpine Printers
brought this lawsuit against the
.defendant
Precision Graphics.
Alpine Printers is asking for you
to find that its printers do NOT
infringe Precision Graphics' patent. Such a finding would allow
Alpine Graphics to continue making and selling printers without having to worry that it will later have to pay
its competitor, Precision Graphics, royalties. Precision Graphics is the owner
of the '123 patent and claims that Alpine's printers infringe the '123 patent.
Even though Alpine Printers is the plaintiff in this case, Precision Graphics
will make its arguments first because it bears the burden of proof."
iion Graphics, Inc.l
ti

"Precision Graphics is one of the

-.

largest and most trusted manufacturers and suppliers ofprinters. The
defendant, Alpine Printers, also
makes printers, infringingprinters,
Pthat
directly compete with Precision Graphics."
"When my client learned that
Alpine Printers had wrongly taken their technology and was infringing the' 123
patent, it sent numerous letters demanding that Alpine either pay Precision
Graphics a royalty or stop infringing the patent. They did neither. Instead,
Alpine continued to infringe the patent and then had the gall to sue us. But
after you have seen the evidence, I am confident that you will conclude that
Alpine Printers has been infringing the '123 patent."
"That's why you should give us a
verdict of infringement and make
our competitor, Alpine Printers,
pay for the damage they've done to

our sales and marketability of our

Q

"
t-

patented oval-shaped printhead."
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"Ladies and Gentlemen ofthejury,

A

I represent the plaintiff, Alpine

-

(

-

Ifigr

Printers, in this case. When Precision Graphics realized that they

were losing to Alpine Printers in
the market place, they chose to
threaten Alpine with their patent.
"However, Alpine Printers
knows that it does NOT infringe the '123 patent, and that's why we filed this
lawsuit against Precision Graphics. We want to put an end to these threats
so that we can get back to our real business, making world class printers and
beating Precision Graphics in the marketplace. After you see the evidence,
I am sure you will agree with us and return a verdict of no infringement."
"The patent holder, Precision
Graphics, keeps on telling you that
Cla
-Alpine Printers somehow "took"
their technology. Nothing could
O
thiet
be further from the truth. Alpine
developed its stadium-shaped
rke 0
l
aid
...
.
i
printhead technology independently from Precision Graphics.
We didn't even know that Precision Graphics had a patent on oval-shaped
printhead technology until after we had been selling our printers. We had been
beating them in the market and then suddenly they sent us a letter accusing
us of patent infringement. That is the first time we learned of their patent.
"That's why you need to declare
that our products do not infringe

the' 123 patent. LetAlpine Printers
compete with Precision Graphics
in the marketplace without the fear

patent threats."

,

v
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C. Scenario #3 (Regular Infringement): Non-Practicing Entity v.
Alleged Infringer
"This lawsuit was brought by the
Technology Ventures
against the defendant Alpine
V.a
Printers. Technology Ventures is
the owner of the '123 patent. The
attorney for the plaintiff, Technology Ventures, will argue that
the defendant, Alpine Printers,
infringes the '123 patent. The attorney for the defendant, Alpine Printers,
will argue that Alpine Printers does NOT infringe the '123 patent."
PecisionGaics, Iplaintiff

"Technology Ventures is a leading
printer technology company. We
buy patents and license them to
those companies that need our
technology. The defendant, Alpine
Printers, makes printers, infringing
printers."
"When my client learned that
Alpine Printers had wrongly taken their invention and was infringing on
the '123 patent, we sent numerous letters demanding that Alpine either pay
Technology Ventures pay a royalty or stop infringing the patent. They did
neither. That's why we are here today, and that's why we filed this lawsuit.
After you have seen the evidence, I am confident that you will conclude that
Alpine Printers has been infringing the '123 patent."
,

"That's why you should give us a
verdict of infringement and make
this infringer, Alpine Printers, pay
for what they've unjustly taken by

0

0

0

-infringing

on our patent rights."

TESTING THE WHITE HAT EFFECT IN PATENT LITIGATION

"Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury,

A

-

I represent the defendant, Alpine

(

-

I

Printers, in this case. Because
Alpine's printers are incredibly
successful, Technology Ventures
chose to sue my client for patent
infringement. Now Technology
Ventures doesn't make anything.
They just own patents and try to get money from real technology companies
that actually make products.
"However, Alpine Printers knows that it does NOT infringe the '123
patent. We just want to get back to our real business, making world class printers. After you see the evidence, I am sure you will agree with us and return a
verdict of no infringement."
"The patent holder, Technology
Ventures, keeps on telling you that

-".

Alpine Printers somehow "took" i i
f
their technology. Nothing could
t ieco
be further from the truth. Alpine
C..
developed its own stadium-shaped
...
.
ink
printhead technology independently from Technology Ventures.
We didn't even know that Technology Ventures had a patent on oval-shaped
printhead technology until after we had been selling our printers. In fact, we
didn't even know of Technology Ventures' existence because we have never
seen them in the market. They do not make or sell printers. We only learned
of them and their patent after they started sending letters seeking money."
;

"That's why you need to return a
non-infringement verdict. Reject
Technology Ventures' lawsuit and
let us do what real companies domaking products, notjust asserting

patents."

.

.

-

. -

-(:-_r--4

-

-
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D. Scenario #4 (Declaratory Judgment): Alleged Infringer v. NonPracticing Entity

"The plaintiff Alpine Printers
brought this lawsuit against the
.defendant
Technology Ventures.
Alpine Printers is asking for you to
find that that its printers do NOT
infringe Technology Ventures' patent. Such a finding would allow
Alpine Printers to continue making and selling printers without having to worry that it will later need to pay
royalties to Technology Ventures. Technology Ventures is the owner of the
'123 patent and claims that Alpine's printers infringe the '123 patent. Even
though Alpine Printers is the plaintiff in this case, Technology Ventures will
make its argument first because it bears the burden of proof."
"Technology Ventures is a leading
printer technology company. We
buy patents and license them to
those companies that need our
technology. The defendant, Alpine
Printers, makes printers, infringing

Pei

-printers."

"When my client learned that
Alpine Printers, had wrongly taken their invention and was infringing on
the '123 patent, we sent numerous letters demanding that Alpine either pay
a royalty to Technology Ventures or stop infringing the patent. They did
neither. Instead, Alpine continued to infringe the patent, and then they had
the gall to sue us. But after you have seen the evidence, I am confident that
you will conclude that Alpine Printers has been infringing the '123 patent."

0

0

,infringing

"That's why you should give us a
verdict of infringement and make
this infringer, Alpine Printers, pay
for what they've unjustly taken by
on our patent rights."

TESTING THE WHITE HAT EFFECT IN PATENT LITIGATION

"Ladies and Gentlemen of the

A

jury, I represent the plaintiff, Al-

-

-

*

'

-

pine Printers, in this case. Because
Alpine's printers are incredibly
successful, Technology Ventures
chose to threaten Alpine with their
patent. NowTechnology Ventures
does not make anything. Theyjust
own patents and try to get money from real technology companies that make
actual products.
"However, Alpine Printers knows that it does NOT infringe the' 123 patent,
and that's why we filed this lawsuit against Technology Ventures. We want
to put an end to these threats so that we can get back to our real business,
making world class printers. After you see the evidence, I am sure you will
agree with us and return a verdict of no infringement."
"The patent holder, Technology
Ventures, keeps on telling you that
C
shpe
Alpine Printers somehow "took"
their technology. Nothing could
a
be further from the truth. Alpine
ano
pa;n
developed its own stadium-shaped
.....
..
ink
printhead technology independently from Technology Ventures.
We didn't even know that Technology Ventures had a patent on oval-shaped printhead technology until after
we had been selling our printers. In fact, we didn't even know of Technology
Ventures' existence because we have never seen them in the market. They do
not make or sell printers. We only learned of them and their patent after they
started sending letters seeking money."
"That's why you need to declare
that our products do not infringe

0

the' 123 patent. Let Alpine Printers .
do what real companies do - making products, not just asserting

patents."
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---

